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Abstract—The rapid growth of digital images motivates individuals and organizations to upload their images to the cloud server. To
preserve the privacy, image owners would prefer to encrypt the images before uploading, but it would strongly limit the efficient usage
of images. Plenty of existing schemes on privacy-preserving Content-Based Image Retrieval (PPCBIR) try to seek the balance
between security and retrieval ability. However, compared to the advanced technologies in CBIR like Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN), the existing PPCBIR schemes are far deficient in both accuracy and efficiency. With more cloud service providers, the
collaborative secure image retrieval service provided by multiple cloud servers becomes possible. In this paper, inspired by additive
secret sharing technology, we propose a series of additive secure computing protocols on numbers and matrices with better efficiency,
and then show their application in PPCBIR. Specifically, we extract CNN features, decrease the dimension of features and build the
index securely with the help of our protocols, which include the full process of image retrieval in plaintext domain. The experiments and
security analysis demonstrate the efficiency, accuracy and security of our scheme.
Index Terms—Privacy-preserving Image Retrieval, Additive Secret Sharing, Pre-trained CNN, Secure PCA, Secure Index Building
F
1 INTRODUCTION
R ECENT years have witnessed the explosive growth ofpersonal image, and services like CBIR are utilized
by more and more people with the help of cloud com-
puting. Accordingly, the CBIR technologies attract plenty
of researchers. The schemes on feature extraction [1] from
images and index building [2] for large-scale vectors have
been researched in detail and these excellent schemes have
been put into practice like Google search by image.
It should be noticed that images contain rich sensitive
information in many cases. For instance, patients would not
like to expose their medical images. As the Cloud Server
(CS) is always not fully trusty, it is unsuitable to upload
the plaintext images to CS directly. Therefore, more and
more researchers pay their attention to PPCBIR. The PPCBIR
schemes should not only keep the accuracy and efficiency
of image retrieval, but also ensure the images and their
features will not be exposed under the reasonable security
assumption.
However, due to the security restrictions, the accuracy
and efficiency of existing PPCBIR schemes are much lower
than works [3] in CBIR. For instance, the features used in
PPCBIR either put a heavy burden [4] on the image owner
or show inferiority [5] during the retrieval. The main reason
for the inferiority is the plenty of non-linear computation
appeared in the state-of-the-art CBIR schemes. It should be
noticed that the traditional functional encryption tools are
quite low efficient when facing these computations.
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With more and more different cloud server manufactur-
ers are willing to provide cloud computing services, the
service provided by two non-collusion CS attracts many
researchers in recent years. The attendance of two non-
collusion CS can avoid the utilization of traditional high-
complexity functional encryption methods, which gives a
new way to decrease the consumption of secure retrieval.
Additive secret sharing is a typical technology which
widely used in Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC).
Recently, more researchers utilize this technology to execute
their tasks [6]–[8] under the environment of cloud comput-
ing. Especially, recent work [9] constructs protocols that can
support the secure computation on almost all basic elemen-
tary functions in constant-rounds interaction based on ad-
ditive secret sharing. However, the existing schemes always
ignore secure matrix computation and cause unnecessary
communication complexity for ensuring the information-
theoretic security of input.
Accordingly, in this work, we aim to bridge the gap
between PPCBIR and CBIR based on additive secret sharing
technology. We first construct some basic secure compu-
tation protocols based on two non-collusion servers, then
show how to utilize them in PPCBIR. In summary, we
mainly make the following contributions:
1) We construct a series of novel protocols based on
additive secret sharing. Especially, besides a more
efficient secure comparison method, the computation
protocol on matrices like matrix inversion is also
designed to support complex computation.
2) Secure CNN features are extracted as visual descrip-
tors for image retrieval from a pre-trained VGG16 by
using the proposed protocols. Due to the efficiency of
our protocols, our scheme consumes much less time
than a recent CNN feature extraction method [6].
3) Based on the secure matrix inversion protocol, we
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further propose the scheme which could execute se-
cure feature compression, e.g., Principle Component
Analysis (PCA), within constant rounds interaction.
We also expand the comparison protocol to secure
sorting for better supporting index building on en-
crypted features. To our knowledge, this is the first
work that considers the way of compressing en-
crypted features in PPCBIR. The utilization of com-
pression and index greatly decrease the consumption
during the secure retrieval.
4) We test the proposed scheme on two real-world
image databases and demonstrate that our scheme
is far better than the previous PPCBIR schemes in
both accuracy and efficiency. Especially, the accuracy
is consistent with the plaintext state, which verifies
the lossless property of our protocols.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In section
2, we briefly introduce the existing schemes on CBIR and
PPCBIR. Some preliminaries will be described in section 3.
The system model will be given in section 4. Some basic
protocols will be proposed in section 5. Section 6 gives the
details of our scheme. The security analysis and experiment
results will be shown in section 7 and 8. Finally, we make
the conclusion in section 9.
2 RELATED WORK
We introduce the existing work related to this paper from
the perspective of CBIR and PPCBIR.
2.1 Content-Based Image Retrieval
In the early stage of CBIR, the global features [10], such
as color and texture, are firstly extracted by researchers.
However, as the global feature is fragile to the influence
like illumination or rotation. Benefiting from the scale-space
theory, local features [11] (e.g., SIFT) are proposed and
show a great advantage to global features. Some following
local features like SURF [12] try to accelerate the extraction
process. However, local features extracted from images are
large and unstable, in this case, the actual retrieval time con-
sumption will be unacceptable. Many feature aggregation
methods, like Bag-Of-Words (BOW) [13], are proposed to
cope with this problem. During the offline phase (i.e., before
retrieval), a codebook is trained and the local features of
each image will be finally encoded as the unified feature
vector.
With the rapid development of CNN, the feature ex-
tracted by the pre-trained CNN shows a great advantage
[14] to traditional hand-crafted features. Although the neu-
ral network is widely used in plenty of supervised learning
tasks, as CBIR is typically an unsupervised task, pre-trained
CNN is more reasonable for the image retrieval scene.
Interestingly, Babenko et al. [15] found that the CNN trained
in a quite different large image database (e.g., ImageNet
dataset [16]) can still show excellent retrieval accuracy in a
new dataset. In the later research, Uijlings et al. [14] noticed
that the feature extracted from the convolutional layer is
better than the final fully connected layer. However, similar
to the local feature, the feature vectors extracted from the
convolutional layer are in high dimension. For instance, the
size of features, extracted from the last convolutional layer
in VGG16, will be 512 ×M/16 ×N/16, where M , N is the
length and width of the input color image. Babenko et al.
[17] further noticed that the simpler aggregation method,
like computing the mean value of each dimension as the
feature, is more suitable for deep features. The above deep
descriptor can be aggregated as a 512-dim (dimension) fea-
ture for each image. Although some later works [3] propose
more optimization tricks, the improvement of accuracy is no
longer outstanding for common images.
A problem closely related to CBIR is Nearest-Neighbor
Search (NNS). After getting image features, it is still a
difficult problem to search for some nearest images from
a database that contains large-scale images efficiently. Ac-
curate search is always time-consuming due to the ”curse
of dimension”, and the mainstream schemes on NNS try to
cope with the Approximate NNS (ANNS) problem. To our
knowledge, the schemes in ANNS can be classified into the
four categories: tree-based index [18], hash-based index [19],
Product Quantization (PQ [20]), and graph-based index [2].
The kernel task in ANNS is reducing the computational
complexity of retrieval by constructing an index in the offline
phase. Tree-based schemes achieve the goal by splitting the
original space into tree structure subspaces. During the
retrieval, only points in partial subspaces will be involved in
the actual distance computation. Therefore the most signifi-
cant problem is how to divide the original space. One typical
scheme called HKM (Hierarchical k-Means [18], [21]) tries
to use typical k-means to construct the index. This scheme
firstly uses k-means to divide all the data into k different
categories. Then, for each category, if the vectors in the
current category are too many, the server will use k-means
to split this category again. The index building process will
be executed until the number of vectors in each category
less than a fixed number.
Hash-based schemes follow the idea that the neighbor
points in high dimension will still be neighbors when
they are mapped into the low dimension. They build a
reasonable mapping method called Locality Sensitive Hash
(LSH) family [22] for common distance measurements (e.g.,
Euclidean distance). The original vector will be mapped to
an integer number, and the similar images have a higher
probability to collide (i.e., same hash value) with each other.
One typical LSH method called C2LSH (Count Collusion
LSH [19]) proposed the concept of dynamic collision and
virtual rehash, which got significant storage and accuracy
advantage. Briefly speaking, they construct a series of LSH
mapping functions in the same LSH family, then use these
functions to map all vectors in the database. The vectors
which have higher collision frequency will have the chance
to participate in actual distance computation. We will de-
scribe more calculation details of HKM and C2LSH in
subsection 3.3.
In recent years, great progress has been made in the
PQ-based and graph-based schemes, which make billion-
scale vector retrieval practical. Although the motivation
behind these methods is far different from the former two
categories, however, the actual calculation is similar (e.g.,
multiplication, comparison, etc.). For simplicity and gener-
ality, in this paper, we choose two typical methods HKM
and C2LSH as examples and apply them in encrypted image
PRIVACY-PRESERVING IMAGE RETRIEVAL BASED ON ADDITIVE SECRET SHARING 3
feature vectors index building. It will be easy to notice that
other ANNS schemes are also able to incorporate into our
work.
2.2 Privacy-preserving Content-Based Image Retrieval
For security considerations, the PPCBIR task has attracted
more and more researchers in this decade. Different from
CBIR, the schemes in PPCBIR need to protect the image and
its feature for the owner of the image and provide the CBIR
service to authorized users with the help of the cloud server.
Existing schemes on PPCBIR can be classified into
two categories: feature-encryption based schemes and image-
encryption based schemes. In the first category [4], [23], [24],
the image owner needs to extract the features from plaintext
images and builds an index for them. Then the owner
uploads encrypted images and a corresponding index to the
cloud server. Since the feature extraction and index building
are always resource-consuming tasks, it is not appropriate
for leaving them to the image owner.
In this case, schemes [5], [25] in the second category,
which outsources these tasks, attract more researchers in
recent years. In this category, the image owner only needs
to encrypt his images and outsources them to CS. The
key problem here is how to extract the valid feature from
an encrypted image. In this case, schemes in the second
category can be classified into two classes based on the type
of encrypted features that CS extracts from the encrypted
images. The detailed information is described as follows.
2.2.1 schemes based on statistic feature
The schemes in the first class extract statistic histograms
as the encrypted image feature. The main method here is
protecting the images and their features by permutation and
keeping valid distance between encrypted images. Ferreira
et al. [26] proposed a tailor-made encryption scheme for
images. In this scheme, the image color is protected by value
substitution and image texture is shuffled randomly by rows
and columns. After uploading, the HSV (Hue-Saturation-
Value) color histograms are extracted from the encrypted
images at the CS side. The index building will be further
built by CS. It should be noted that both features and the
index are in the encrypted domain, however, the Manhattan
distance between features is still same as the distance in
plaintext state. Since the global feature is too weak for the
retrieval, Xia et al. [5] further propose a scheme called BOEW
which considers the encryption in each block and ensure
that the encrypted local features are valid for retrieval. The
server further aggregates the encrypted local features with
the typical BOW model which greatly improves retrieval
efficiency.
As the encryption in spatial domain malfunctions the
compression, that is, it will greatly increase the size of
encrypted images. Therefore, some schemes [25], [27] try
to execute PPCBIR in JPEG-domain. These methods encrypt
the image in JPEG-format and ensure the JPEG-format be
kept after the encryption. The encryption methods used are
almost similar (e.g., permutation) to the schemes in spatial
domain. It should be noted that the above schemes are all
based on probabilistic encryption, which makes the security
of their schemes depends on the size of image content,
and the statistic feature shows a mediocre performance for
retrieval.
2.2.2 schemes based on typical feature
The second class tries to extract typical features (e.g., SIFT)
from the encrypted images. Different from the statistic
feature, plenty of linear, nonlinear, and comparison com-
putations appear during the extraction process of typical
features. To our knowledge, Hsu et al. [28] first investigate
privacy-preserving SIFT extraction in the encrypted domain
based on the Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [29] tool which
supports direct computation on the ciphertext. However,
their scheme suffers from high interaction rounds and po-
tential security risks. The following schemes [30] notice that
one single server is hard to cope with these problems. They
further try to use multiple servers (e.g., two servers) to
collaboratively execute the encrypted SIFT feature extrac-
tion. For example, Hu et al. [31] combine the Somewhat HE
[32] and parallel technology, propose batched secure mul-
tiplication and comparison protocol between two servers.
However, these schemes are still too time-consuming rather
than practice. In recent work, Liu et al. [33] try to extract
encrypted features based on a pre-trained CNN model (e.g.,
VGG16). The better feature extractor brings much higher
accuracy.
It should be noted that the encrypted feature extraction
by pre-trained CNN is equivalent to the following problem:
how to execute the inference process of CNN with known
parameters in safety. There are many schemes [6] try to
handle this fundamental problem in recent years. The HE
tool is also considered first. However, due to the nonlinear
computation or comparison in the activation layer and pool-
ing layer, the basic HE can not satisfy demands. There are
two main strategies to cope with this problem: one type of
schemes [34] tries to use SMC technology, such as garbled
circuit [35], to assist nonlinear operations; the others [36]
attempt to seek approximate algorithms to replace them.
Actually [33] can be seen as the utilization of [34]. However,
these schemes not only cause plenty of time consumption
but also need to convert ciphertext to an integer (or bits),
which will cause extra precision loss.
To alleviate the problem, Huang et al. [6] proposed a
scheme completely based on additive secret sharing which
naturally supports linear computation on the ciphertext.
They further construct a secure comparison protocol based
on Beaver′s triples [37]. The avoidance of HE makes the
scheme obtain a great advantage in time consumption,
however, the protocols they proposed still have lots of room
for improvement.
In this paper, we propose a novel PPCBIR scheme
based on pre-trained CNN. Different from the previous low-
efficiency schemes, we first propose enough novel compu-
tation protocols based on additive secret sharing, then sim-
ulate the feature extraction in state-of-the-art CBIR schemes,
and further propose secure feature compression and index
building technologies to decrease the consumption. The uti-
lization of these strategies makes our scheme both efficient
and accurate.
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3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Image feature extracted by pre-trained CNN
In this work, the feature is extracted from a typical CNN
model called VGG16, and the parameters pre-trained by a
large image dataset [16] are utilized. CNN is a sequence of
layers that compute and transform the input into output.
Each layer is made up of a set of neurons. Like most of the
other CNN models, VGG16 is composed of Fully Connected
layer (FC), Convolutional layer (Conv), Activation Layer
(AL), and Pooling layer (Pool). In detail, each layer contains
the following computation:
• FC and Conv. FC and Conv layer only involve
the linear computation. For example, the neurons in
Conv layer share the same weights W and biases b,
which are often called filters. Consider a filter sizes
n× n, then each neuron in the current layer is trans-
formed from an n× n region of neurons in previous
layer. In detail, the (j, k)th neuron is obtained from
yj,k =
∑n−1
l=0
∑n−1
m=0 wl,mxj+1,k+m + b. Here, wl,m
means the corresponding value in weights matrix W
and x represents the neuron in the previous layer. It
should be noted that the W is fixed when we use
pre-trained CNN. As we disuse the FC layer in the
VGG16, our scheme can deal with images in any size.
• AL. Activation layer provides the non-linear compu-
tation in the neural networks, and Rectified Linear
Unit (ReLU) is the unique AL in VGG16. For the
input matrix X , the ReLU layer returns the result
ReLU(X) composed by max(x, 0), where x is the
member value in X . It is easy to notice that ReLU
only involves comparison computations.
• Pool. The pooling layer partitions the input layer into
a set of non-overlapping rectangles, then a down-
sampling operation is executed on each rectangle
to get the value in the current layer. In VGG16,
max-pooling sizes 2×2 is utilized, which means the
maximum number will be saved in each 2×2 block
and transmitted to the later layer. Max-pooling also
only contains the comparison computations.
3.2 Additive Secret Sharing
Secret sharing is one of the most important technologies
in SMC. The secret information will be randomly split into
multi-shares, and each participant only has one share. The
secret can be reconstructed only when a sufficient number
of shares are combined. Additive secret sharing can be seen
as an (n, n)-threshold secret sharing technology. It means
that the secret x can be randomly split into n shares, for
example, x = x1 + x2 + · · · + xn, and recover the secret
needs all n share, here n ≥ 2. In this paper, we only focus
on the situation that n = 2.
In recent years, more researchers try to use the additive
secret sharing technologies to outsource computation tasks
to CS. For example, the image owner can outsource his
image by randomly splitting the image into two additive
shares, and each cloud server Si (i = 1, 2) owns one share.
For simplicity, the following Si are all represents servers S1
and S2, similarly, the following values, with i in subscript,
represent the additive share of corresponding value if i is
Algorithm 1 Secure matrix multiplication SecMatMul
Input: Si has Xi, Yi.
Output: Si gets (X · Y )i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates random matrixA,B and computes C=A·B.
2: T randomly splits (A, B, C) into two additive share (Ai,
Bi, Ci) and sends the share to corresponding server Si.
Online Phase :
3: Si computes Ei = Xi −Ai and Fi = Yi −Bi.
4: S1 and S2 exchange the share Ei and Fi.
5: Si computes Xi · F + E · Yi + Ci − (i− 1)E · F .
undefined. It should be noted that the additive secret shar-
ing has an important property: each server Si can execute
linear computation without interaction. For example, each
server owns ui, vi, and they want to compute u± v. Due to
(u1 ± v1) + (u2 ± v2) = u ± v, Si only needs to compute ui
± vi, and the result is still the share of u ± v. Similarly, each
server can execute the secure multiplication by a known
number (e.g., pre-trained parameters).
Beaver′s triples is widely used in additive secret shar-
ing to execute the secure multiplication called SecMul. Dur-
ing the offline phase (i.e., before computing secure multiplica-
tion), a pre-computed triple of the form {ai, bi, ci|ab = c} is
generated and (ai, bi, ci) is sent to server Si, here (ai, bi, ci)
is the additive share of (a, b, c). In online phase, each server
computes ei = xi − ai and fi = yi − bi. Then two server
exchange the information of ei and fi. Finally, Si can com-
pute zi = fai + ebi + ci + (i− 1)ef . It is easy to notice that
z1 + z2 = xy. The existing schemes [38] further expand the
secure scalar multiplication to secure matrix dot product as
shown in algorithm 1.
Although the fixed size vectors need to be computed
during Offline phase in algorithm 1, we would show that it is
feasible when facing a specific task in subsection 8.3.2. In re-
cent work, Xiong et al. [9] further expands Beaver′s triples,
and constructs protocols which can support almost all basic
elementary function and four fundamental operations with
only constant-rounds interaction rounds. In the rest of the
paper, an additive share is called a share for simplicity.
3.3 HKM and C2LSH
Excessive comparison operations will lead to low retrieval
efficiency, in this case, a reasonable index is indispensable.
In PPCBIR schemes based on typical features, these methods
can not only accelerate the retrieval, but also significantly
reduce the communication consumption that will be shown
in subsection 8.3.1. For simplicity, the HKM and C2LSH
are chosen to represent tree-based and hash-based index
building schemes. As we focus on the way which employs
these technologies when feature vectors are stored as a share
in two servers, only the numerical calculation process on
feature vectors is given below. The readers can refer to [18]
and [19] for more details (e.g., virtual rehash) about these
schemes.
3.3.1 Index building and query of HKM
As described in subsection 2.1, there are mainly two steps
in the index building process of HKM:
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Fig. 1: An example of HKM. In the figure, five feature
vectors (blue nodes) are indexed by HKM where k set as 2.
(i) Index vectors by k-means. The server divides all the
vectors into k different categories by k-means first. There
are three main steps during executing k-means: firstly, k
random vectors are chosen as the centroid vectors; secondly,
each vector computes their distance to centroid vectors and
joins in the nearest category; finally, the centroid vectors will
be updated as the mean value of new vectors in the current
category. The second and third steps will be executed itera-
tively until a fixed number of times or the centroid vectors
becomes stable.
(ii) Repeat k-means partition. After initial partitioning, the
vectors in each subspace may still be too many. In this
case, to ensure the number of vectors in each subspace less
than a fixed number, the server will execute k-means on
the corresponding subspace where excessive vectors exist.
The partitioning will not end until each subspace meets the
requirements.
After the index building, each vector will become one
leaf node of the HKM tree like Fig. 1. Here, non-leaf nodes
(except the root node) are the centroids of corresponding
space.
During the retrieval, to achieve high efficiency and ac-
curacy, the server will choose enough suitable vectors to
compose candidates. The true distances between query and
candidates will be computed and m-nearest vectors will
be selected from them. Generally speaking, the number of
vectors in candidates is usually over m (e.g., 3 times of
m), in this case, the core challenge is how to seek enough
and high-quality candidates. There are mainly two steps in
HKM after the server gets the query vector:
(i) Seek the nearest vectors. The server computes distances
between query and centroids in the first layer. Then the
server enters the subspace nearest node represents and adds
all other brother nodes into the candidate list. The above
process will be repeated until the server finds leaf nodes.
(ii) Get enough candidate vectors. In HKM, the feature
vectors that the leaf nodes in the above step represent will
be all added into candidates. If not enough, the server will
set the nearest node in the candidate list as the root node
and repeat the above step to get new leaf nodes.
3.3.2 Index building and query of C2LSH
As described in subsection 2.1, there are mainly two steps
in the index building process of C2LSH:
(i) Generate hash functions. The LSH family in C2LSH is
shown as follows:
h~a,b(o) = bh
′
~a,b(o)
w c, (1)
h′~a,b(o) = ~a · ~o+ bwx, (2)
where ~o is a feature vector to be mapped, ~a is the same
dimension vector where each entry is drawn independently
from the standard normal distribution N(0, 1), w is a user-
specified constant (e.g., 1), b is a real number uniformly
random drawn from [0, w) and x is a positive random
integer. It is easy to notice that the hash function in C2LSH
is composed of (~a, b, w, x). The server will generate a series
of LSH functions in this family.
(ii) Map vectors into LSH tables. After generating the
LSH functions, the server will map all the vectors in the
database to a series of LSH tables. Each LSH function will
generate a corresponding LSH table as shown in Table 1.
If the {h~aj ,bj (o)} of feature vector ~o equal to bid, then the
corresponding image identity will be added into bucket bid
in the j-th LSH table, here j ∈ [1,m], and m is the number
of generated LSH functions.
TABLE 1: An example of LSH Table. Here ID is the
identity of the corresponding image.
Bucket identity Image identities in current bucket
bid1 ID1, ID35, ID143, ID146
bid2 ID3, ID131, ID142
· · · · · ·
bidn ID12, ID23, ID138, ID214, ID235
There are mainly two steps during retrieval based on
C2LSH:
(i) Map query into LSH tables. Same as the vectors in the
database, server will use all LSH functions to map the query
vector ~q into corresponding LSH tables. Then the vectors in
the same bid in any LSH table will be seen as one collusion
with the query. The collision information will be stored, and
the vector will be selected into candidates if it reaches a
certain number of collisions.
(ii) Get enough candidate vectors. Similarly, the vectors in
current bid may be insufficient. C2LSH further propose a
scheme called virtual rehash to seek new bids for further
collision count and the calculation during virtual rehash
only needs h′~a,b(q) in each LSH table. [19] gives two ways to
stop seeking candidates: the first one stops whenm or more
vectors whose distance from the query vector is less than a
specific value are found; the second one does when enough
(e.g., 3 ×m) vectors reach a certain number (related to the
number of vectors in the database) of collisions, where m is
the number of vectors returned.
4 PROPOSED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
4.1 System model
Similar to [31] and [33], the proposed scheme involves five
entities, i.e., the image owner, the cloud server S1, cloud
server S2, a trusty party T and authorized users. The system
model is shown in Fig. 2.
Image owner owns a large-scale database I = {Ii}ni=1
with the corresponding identity set ID = {IDi}ni=1 to be
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Fig. 2: System model.
outsourced, here n represents the number of images. To
preserve privacy, the images are all randomly split into
two parts C1 = {C1i }ni=1 and C2 = {C2i }ni=1 based on
additive secret sharing. The encrypted image databases are
separately sent to S1 and S2.
Cloud server S1 and S2 undertake the task of feature
extraction, feature compression, index building, and secure
retrieval. Two cloud servers need to interact with each other
and collaboratively complete the above tasks.
Trusty third party called T takes the charge of generat-
ing random numbers or random vectors which will be used
during the secure computation. It should be noted that the
generation of numbers is offline and lightweight work. The
T can be undertaken by the government or the owner of
images, we will further discuss this problem in subsection
8.3.2.
Authorized user authorized by the image owner has the
authorization to retrieve the corresponding images. During
the retrieval, user sends the trapdoor to two servers and
gets the encrypted images from the servers. The plaintext
results can be obtained by simply adding the corresponding
encrypted versions.
4.2 Security Model
Similar to many previous works [31] in PPCBIR based
on typical features, the semi-honest but non-collusion CS
is considered in our scheme. It means each server will
execute the protocol as asked but will try to analyze the
information from data, however, due to their reputation and
financial interests, they will not collude with each other. As
described above, the third party T only needs to generate
random numbers in the offline phase, which means it can be
undertaken by a low-computation device. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that T is honest and non-colluding.
5 BASIC SECURE COMPUTATION BASED ON TWO
SERVER
5.1 Secure Comparison
The typical comparison schemes [6] based on additive secret
sharing try to use the most significant bit, however, it will
lead to l rounds interaction, where l is the bit-length of
ciphertext. Inspired by multiplicative secret sharing, recent
work [9] proposed a novel comparison protocol that only
Algorithm 2 Secure comparison protocol SecCmp
Input: Si has ui, vi.
Output: Si gets f . If f ≥ 0, then u ≥ v; else u < v.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocol
uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si computes ti = ui − vi.
3: Si generates a random positive number ri.
4: S1 & S2 collaboratively compute fi = SecMul(ti, ri).
5: S1 & S2 re-share fi and get f .
Algorithm 3 Secure ReLU protocol
Input: Si has Xi.
Output: Si gets ReLU(X)i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocol
uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si generates a random matrix Ri composed by random
positive numbers.
3: S1 & S2 collaboratively compute fi = SecMul(xi, ri),
here x and r are the corresponding elements in X and
R.
4: S1 & S2 re-share and get F composed by f . If f ≤ 0,
then set the corresponding xi in X as 0.
needs three rounds of interaction. These schemes try to
ensure the information-theoretic security of input, however,
in the computation process of a practical task, plenty of
intermediate values are practically meaningless. It means
even though we do not protect some insignificant informa-
tion (e.g., the range of value or the ratio between values), a
specific task will not suffer actual damage.
The following phenomenon should be noted: if a number
is multiplied by a random number (except 0), the result is
also random. This means that it is impossible to infer the
input number from the result. At the same time, multiplying
a random positive number will not change the sign of the
original data. Following this observation, a simple but valid
secure comparison process for numbers can be shown in
algorithm 2.
Each server firstly computes the share of u − v, then
the servers compute the multiplication of u − v and a
random positive number which is generated by servers
independently. If the result f = f1+f2 is positive, it implies
that u−v is also positive, and vice versa. We will analyze the
security and potential information leakage of this protocol
in section 7. It is easy to expand SecCmp to compute ReLU
function, which is shown in algorithm 3.
5.2 Secure Matrix Inverse
The motivation of SecCmp is transforming the number,
which needs protection, to another random number in
safety and then re-share the new number. At the same time,
the complex computation we execute on the new number
can be reflected in the original number after a reasonable
transform. In this way, the complexity of operations like
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Algorithm 4 Secure matrix inversion protocol SecMatInv
Input: Si has Xi.
Output: Si gets Yi = (X−1)i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random matrices the sub-protocol
uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si generates a random square matrix Zi.
3: S1 & S2 collaboratively compute Wi = SecMatMul(Zi,
Xi).
4: S1 & S2 re-share and get W , then Si computes W−1.
5: Si computes Yi = W−1 · Zi.
Algorithm 5 Secure division protocol SecDiv
Input: Si has ui and vi.
Output: Si gets (uv )i.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers the sub-protocol
uses and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si generates random number ri.
3: S1 & S2 collaboratively compute fi = SecMul(ui, ri)
and gi = SecMul(vi, ri).
4: S1 & S2 re-share and get g, then Si computes uig .
comparison can be avoided. This motivation can be further
applied to the matrix computation. Inspired by [39], we
propose the secure matrix inverse protocol as algorithm 4.
In SecMatInv, each server first generates a random
square matrix, then servers compute its dot product with
the input. As the property that (Z ·X)−1 · (Z1+Z2) = X−1,
each server can finally get the share of X−1. As the sum
of the random matrix generated by two servers is almost
certainly (i.e., the probability is 1) reversible, for simplicity,
we here ignore the potential risk brought by the random
matrix. It should be noted that this situation can be detected
by calculating the rank of W . Especially when the matrix
is simplified as a number, the secure division computation
SecDiv is shown as algorithm 5.
6 PRIVACY-PRESERVING CBIR BASED ON TWO
SERVERS
In this section, we firstly give the feature extraction process
based on additive secret sharing, then further show the
PCA compression method on encrypted features. Finally,
the secure index building methods based on HKM and
C2LSH are given for better retrieval efficiency. An overview
of the process is shown in Fig. 3.
6.1 Secure Pre-trained CNN Feature extraction and ag-
gregation
In this paper, following the suggestion in [14], the last
activation layer before FC in pre-trained VGG16 is utilized
as a feature extractor. As subsection 4.1 shows, the CNN
model this paper involves mainly contains three different
types of layers called Conv, AL, and Pool.
As the parameters or hyper-parameters are fixed and
known by both two servers, which means all the weights
are just constant in the CNN. For Conv, it is just the secure
constant multiplication which means no interactions are
necessary during the inference process.
ReLU is unique AL in VGG16, as algorithm 3 shows, two
rounds of interaction are needed between the servers. The
values in feature vectors larger than 0 are unchanged, and
the others will be reset as 0 by both Si.
The max-pooling needs to seek the position of the max-
imum value in each 2 × 2 block, due to the comparison
of different values can be executed simultaneously, only
two rounds of interaction will be necessary for finding the
position. Similar to ReLU, the number in the corresponding
position is kept the same, and other numbers will be reset
to 0 by Si.
After the extraction, following the conclusion in [17], the
average aggregation is used to aggregate all the numbers
gotten by each filter. Obviously, no interaction is needed
during the aggregation. Here, each server gets a 512-dim
encrypted feature vector for each image.
6.2 Secure Feature compression
PCA is the most commonly used feature compression
method [3] for accelerating the retrieval. Here, we try to
propose secure PCA computation on the encrypted features
collaboratively stored in two servers. Note that the compres-
sion can significantly reduce communication consumption
during secure retrieval.
To our knowledge, no existing schemes try to execute the
secure PCA based on additive secret sharing, the essential
problem here is the way in computing eigenvectors of the
matrix in safety. The following Lemmas should be noticed
in this case:
Lemma 1. If A and B are similar matrices (i.e., A ∼ B), and
B = P−1AP , then A and B have the same eigenvalues; If there
is an eigenvector ~x under eigenvalue λ of matrix A, then P−1~x
is an eigenvector of B under eigenvalue λ.
Lemma 2. If λ is an eigenvalue of matrix A, then k × λ is
an eigenvalue of matrix k ×A; If there is an eigenvector ~x under
eigenvalue λ of matrix A, then the eigenvector ~x is also under
eigenvalue k × λ of matrix k ×A.
Based on Lemma 1 and 2, algorithm 6 shows the scheme
of PCA on an encrypted matrix. Each server first executes
zero-centering for each column of the matrix Xn×di , the ~mi
composed by mean values will be stored in the server.
Then, each server will randomly generate a matrix Pi
and a random positive number ti, and the matrix (P−1)i
will be collaboratively computed based on SecMatInv.
Here the P and P−1 are generated to transform the original
matrix, and t is used to protect the equivalent eigenvalues.
The Y can be computed with the above information as
shown in line number 5. To simplify the calculation, here we
only let S1 undertake the task of computing eigenvectors.
Due to the high concurrency during the actual task, it is
easy to balance the workload on two servers.
Since Y shares the same eigenvalues with t×X and t is
a positive number, the eigenvectors T under the s maximal
eigenvalues of Y are related to those ofX . In this case, based
on Lemma 1, the P · T is the corresponding eigenvectors of
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Fig. 3: An overview of image outsourcing. The cloud servers will collaboratively compute and store the encrypted
compressed features in the index
Algorithm 6 Secure PCA protocol
Input: Si has Xn×di (n >> d).
Output: Si gets Fn×si .
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers and matrices the
sub-protocols use and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si computes the mean value for each column of Xi and
composes d-dim vector ~mi, then computes Xi = Xi - ~mi.
3: Si generates a random square matrix P d×di and a ran-
dom number ti.
4: S1 & S2 collaboratively compute P−1i =
SecMatInv(Pi).
5: S1 & S2 collaboratively compute Yi = SecMul(ti,
SecMatMul(P−1i , SecMatMul(SecMatMul(X
T
i , Xi),
Pi))).
6: S2 sends Y2 to S1, then S1 computes the eigenvectors of
Y , then pick the T d×s composed by eigenvectors under
the s maximal eigenvalues and sends them to S2.
7: Si computes V d×si = Pi · T .
8: S1 & S2 collaboratively compute Ud×si which is com-
posed by SecMul(vjki , v
jk
i ) for all v
jk
i in Vi, here
j ∈ [1, d], k ∈ [1, s].
9: Si computes the sum value for each column in Ud×si ,
and compose a s-dim vector ~ri, then re-share it.
10: Si gets ~r and computes v
jk
i =
vjki√
rk
for all vjki in Vi, here
rk means the k-th element in ~r.
11: S1 & S2 collaboratively compute Fn×si =
SecMatMul(Xi, Vi).
X . In line number 8 to 10, to ensure the stability of the
results, the vectors in all s-dim are standardized. To reduce
the interaction, the ~r composed by the squared sum of each
eigenvector which is insensitive will be directly re-shared
by servers.
Due to SecMul(ti, SecMatMul(SecMatMul(XTi , Xi),
Pi)) can be calculated in parallel with SecMatInv(Pi).
The interaction rounds needed in secure PCA protocol is
8 if S1 undertakes the task of computing eigenvectors. The
complexity of communication sizes is O(nd), where n and
d are dimensions of the uncompressed matrix.
Algorithm 7 Secure sorting SecSort
Input: Si has numbers {uli}, l ∈ [1, n], n is the amount of
numbers.
Output: Si gets the sorted numbers {vli}.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers and matrices the
sub-protocols use and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: Si randomly generates a positive number ti.
3: S1 & S2 collaboratively compute f li = SecMul(ti, u
l
i)
for each l in range [1, n].
4: S1 & S2 re-share the {f li}, then sort {f l}.
5: Si gets {vli} by permuting {uli} based on the size relation
of numbers in {f l}.
Finally, the server can get the share of compressed data
based on the share of original data and compression matrix
V . Each server will save the mean vector ~mi and the
compression matrix Vi for the retrieval process.
6.3 Secure Index Building
To accelerate the retrieval process, the index building
schemes are considered on encrypted feature vectors stored
in two servers. The typical HKM and C2LSH are used as
examples, and it will be easy to notice that the other schemes
can be combined with our scheme too.
The comparison of distance is indispensable during the
index building or query process. However, if we use the
SecCmp to compare plenty of distances and try to find the
minimum one, it will lead to too high interaction rounds
or too much parallel calculation. For example, to seek the
minimum value in 10 numbers, it will lead to 55 times
of comparison in parallel. Note that the size relation of
distances between features is insensitive, we propose the
algorithm 7 to execute secure sorting effectively.
In algorithm 7, each server generates a random positive
number and gets {fki } by executing SecMul on the number
and share of true distances, then re-share them. In this
case, the true distances will be protected by a random
multiplication, but the size relation will be kept. The server
can get the right size relationship of the share based on
{fk}. For efficiency, we also use the SecSort protocol in
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Algorithm 8 Secure k-means protocol
Input: Si has k, one share of vectors {~xli} and the ID each
vector corresponds, here l ∈ [1, n], n is the number of
vectors.
Output: Si gets one share of cluster centers, and the infor-
mation the vectors in each cluster.
Offline Phase :
1: T generates enough random numbers and matrices the
sub-protocols use and sends to Si.
Online Phase :
2: S1 randomly picks k vectors as the centroid { ~CLi} and
sends the corresponding ID to S2.
3: for l = 1 : n do
4: S1 & S2 collaboratively compute the squared eu-
clidean distances between ~xli and centroid vectors
based on SecMatMul.
5: S1 & S2 collaboratively seek the nearest centroid
vector of ~xli based on SecSort.
6: Si puts the ~xli in the category which nearest centroid
represents.
7: end for
8: Si computes the mean value of vectors in each category,
which is actually the share of new centroid vectors ~CLi.
9: Repeat line 3 to line 8 until a certain rounds or { ~CLi}
unchanging.
the pooling layer for each 2×2 block. After constructing the
secure sorting protocol, the secure index building schemes
are shown as follows.
6.3.1 secure index building of HKM
As described in subsection 3.3, there are mainly two steps
in the secure index building of HKM:
(i) Index encrypted vectors by secure k-means. The key
problem in this step is the way of executing secure k-
means based on the share stored in two servers. It should
be noted that the identities of images are owned by both
servers, which means they can execute the calculation on the
corresponding vectors independently and synchronously by
a determined algorithm. At the same time, some hyper-
parameters, like the number of images or the value of k that
HKM uses, are also known by both servers. In this case,
since the operations on vectors during k-means are only
addition and comparison, and those are easy to execute as
shown in algorithm 8.
In algorithm 8, S1 first randomly choose initial centroids
and share it to S2 for synchronization. Then, each server
collaboratively executes clustering. The squared Euclidean
distances are computed and SecSort is utilized for seeking
the nearest centroid. Since the vectors in each category are
known by both servers, the new mean value (i.e., centroid
vector) can be easily computed without interaction.
(ii) Repeat secure k-means partition. The situation is same
as that in plaintext, as ID is known by both servers, which
means each server can judge and repeat partition indepen-
dently and synchronously. After the index building, each
server can generate the same tree structure which is also
same as that in plaintext state, however, the non-leaf nodes
(except root node) and leaf nodes are only the share of true
values.
Since the k-means in each layer can be executed in paral-
lel, the complexity of interaction rounds during HKM index
building isO(logkN), and the complexity of communication
sizes is O(NdlogkN), where k is the hyper-parameter in
HKM, N and d are the number and dimension of vectors in
the database.
6.3.2 secure index building of C2LSH
As described in subsection 3.3, there are mainly two steps
during the secure index building process:
(i) Generate secure hash functions. It should be noted that
the generator of LSH function is generating random num-
bers that are subject to a specific distribution. In this case,
the following lemma should be noted.
Lemma 3: If two independent random variables X, Y satisfy
normal distribution N(a1, b1) and N(a2, b2), then X+Y satisfy
normal distribution N(a1 + a2, b1 + b2)
As C2LSH needs the ~a whose elements obey N(0, 1), in
this case, each server can generate the elements in ~ai which
obey N(0, 1/2) independently. w is a constant value known
by both two servers. As b is a random number in [0, w),
therefore, it can be generated by any server. For simplicity,
let us assume that this task is undertaken by S1, which
means b2 = 0.
(ii) Mapping encrypted vectors into LSH tables. Similar to
formula 2, the servers first compute the share of h′(o)
collaboratively as follows,
h′~a,b(o)i = SecMatMul(~ai · ~oi) + biwx. (3)
Here ~ai, ~oi and bi are the share of ~a, ~o and b, the ~a, ~o, b,w and
x are the same definition as formula 2. After computation,
the servers will re-share them and get the {h′~aj ,bj (ok)},
where j ∈ [1,m] and k ∈ [1, n], m is the number of
generated LSH functions, n is the number of vectors in the
database. Then each server can further compute bid each
share of vectors belong based on formula 1. Finally, each
server can add all IDs into the corresponding bucket in LSH
tables. After the index building, two servers will generate
the same LSH tables that are also same as that in plaintext
state, however, the vectors corresponding to the IDs are
only the share of true values.
Since the computation and share of {h′~aj ,bj (ok)} can be
executed in parallel, the interaction rounds during C2LSH
index building is 2, and the size relation is about O(Nd),
here N and d are the number and dimension of vectors in
the database.
6.4 Secure Retrieval
This section introduces the actual retrieval process and that
is the only online phase from the respective of the secure
retrieval task. The authorized user splits the query image
into two shares and sends it as the trapdoor to Si.
After verifying the authorization of the user, servers will
extract the aggregation feature of the query as subsection
6.1. Then servers collaboratively compress the extracted
feature ~qi, with the ~mi and Vi stored during compression, by
computing ~qi = SecMatMul(~qi− ~mi, Vi). Finally, according
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to the method of index building, servers collaboratively
search the m nearest images of the query. The retrieval
process of HKM and C2LSH is shown as follows.
6.4.1 secure retrieval based on HKM
As described in subsection 3.3, there are mainly two steps
during the secure retrieval based on HKM:
(i) Seek the nearest encrypted vectors. The servers will
collaboratively compare the distances between query and
centroids in each layer to find the nearest vectors and
maintain the candidate list. The above operation only in-
volves multiplication and sorting, which means the servers
can easily finish the above task based on SecMatMul and
SecSort. The above process can be executed iteratively
until servers find the leaf nodes.
(ii) Get enough encrypted candidate vectors. The server will
add the corresponding encrypted vectors in the current
subspace into candidates. Based on the candidate list and
protocols, the servers can execute the above step until they
find enough candidates independently and synchronously.
Finally, the squared Euclidean distances will be computed
based on SecMatMul, and m nearest vectors can be found
with the help of SecSort. The servers can finally send the
corresponding encrypted images to the authorized user.
Since the servers need to seek the leaf nodes and com-
pute the true distances between query and candidates, the
complexity of interaction rounds during retrieval of HKM
is O(logkN + 3), the complexity of communication sizes
is O(dklogkN + md), where k is the hyper-parameter in
HKM, N is the number of vectors in the database, d is the
dimension of query vector, m is the number of vectors in
candidates.
6.4.2 secure retrieval based on C2LSH
As described in subsection 3.3, there are mainly two steps
during the secure retrieval based on C2LSH:
(i) Map encrypted query into LSH tables. Similar to the
calculation during the index building, the {h′~aj ,bj (q)i} will
be computed based on encrypted query feature ~qi and pre-
generated encrypted LSH functions, here j is the same
definition as that in subsection 6.3.2. Then the {h′~aj ,bj (q)i}
values are shared and the bid of query in each LSH table
can be computed. In this case, since ID is known by both
servers, the collision information can be counted by each
server independently and synchronously.
(ii) Get enough encrypted candidate vectors. Also,
{h′~aj ,bj (q)i} is shared by both servers, the virtual rehash
in each LSH table can be completed by each server without
interaction. Like HKM, after getting enough candidates, the
SecMatMul and SecSort will be finally used to get m-
nearest images. To avoid the extra interaction, only the sec-
ond completion condition in [19] is used in our experiment.
Since the servers need to map the query and compute
some true distances, the interaction rounds during C2LSH
index building is 5, and the complexity of communication
sizes isO(md), where d is the dimension of the query vector,
m is the number of vectors in candidates.
7 SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security analysis of our scheme is under the typical
universal composability framework [40]. The execution of
our scheme mainly involves the interaction between two
cloud servers, and the process of the interaction is defined
as the real experiment. In the proposed scheme, two cloud
servers are potential adversaries. To prove the security of the
protocol, it suffices to show that the view of the corrupted
party (i.e., S1 or S2) is simulatable given its input and
output.
In the ideal experiment, the simulator S is defined as
the one that can simulate the view of the corrupted party
by using functionality F . In this paper, we define the F as
follows: F owns the input information and generates the
random numbers or matrices locally, then it completes the
calculation as subprotocols, the corresponding view of S
will be filled by the calculation results. In the following, we
will prove that the view is indistinguishable to that in the
real world, and the view will not expose the detailed input
information. To simplify the proofs, the following Lemmas
will be used.
Lemma 4. A protocol is perfectly simulatable if all its sub-
protocols are perfectly simulatable.
Lemma 5. The protocol SecMul and SecMatMul are secure in
the honest-but-curious model
The readers can refer [41], [6], and [38] for the proofs of
Lemma 4 and 5.
Theorem 1. The protocol SecCmp is secure in the honest-
but-curious model
Proof. For S1, the view1 during executing protocol will
be (t1, a1, b1, c1, α2, β2, f1, f). Here t1 is randomly chosen
from the range [0, +∞), which is indistinguishable. Here
(a1, b1, c1, α2, β2, f1) is simulatable based on Lemma 4
and 5. For simplicity, we assume f is positive. Due to f is
the result of ((u1 − v1) + (u2 − v2))×(t1 + t2) computed
by F . Due to t1 and t2 only have the limitation that they
should be positive, which means that f is randomly chosen
from the range [0, +∞). In this case, f is indistinguishable
from the real world. However, due to the S has detailed
information of t1, the range of (u − v) (e.g., [0, ft1 )) will be
exposed, however, it is still an infinite field. The view for S2
will get a similar conclusion. In this case, the simulator can
get an indistinguishable view and the view will not expose
the detailed information of u, v or u− v.
Theorem 2. The protocol SecMatInv is secure in the
honest-but-curious model
Proof. For Si, except those brought by SecMatMul,
the viewi = (Zi,W ). Here Zi is composed of random
numbers that are indistinguishable. W is the result of
(Z1+Z2)·(X1+X2) computed by F . Due to the randomiza-
tion of Z , any non-singular matrix in the corresponding size
is the potential result, which means W is indistinguishable.
Theorem 3. The protocol SecDiv is secure in the honest-
but-curious model
Proof. For Si, besides those brought by SecMul, the
viewi = (ti, ui). Here ti is randomly chosen from R which
is indistinguishable. y is the result of (v1 + v2) · (k1 + k2)
computed by F . Due to the randomization of k, any non-
zero number is the potential result, which means y is indis-
tinguishable.
Theorem 4. The protocol SecSort is secure in the honest-
but-curious model
PRIVACY-PRESERVING IMAGE RETRIEVAL BASED ON ADDITIVE SECRET SHARING 11
Proof. For Si, besides those brought by SecMul, the
viewi = (ti, {f l}), where l ∈ [1, n] and n is the amount
of input numbers. Here ti is randomly chosen from R which
is indistinguishable. f l is the result of (ul1 + u
l
2) × (t1 + t2)
computed by F . Due to the randomization of t, any non-
zero number is the potential result f l, which means {f l}
is indistinguishable. However, since S knows t is invariant,
the ratio of numbers in {ul} will be exposed.
Theorem 5. The CNN feature extraction process is secure in
the honest-but-curious model
Proof. All views in Si are brought by SecCmp, and
SecSort, therefore, the CNN feature extraction process is
secure based on Lemma 4.
Theorem 6. The secure PCA protocol is secure in the honest-
but-curious model
Proof. For S1, besides those brought by SecMul,
SecMatMul, and SecMatInv, the view1 = (P1, t1, Y, ~r).
Here P1 and k1 are uniform random numbers that are
obviously indistinguishable. Y is the result of t×P−1·XT ·
X · P computed by F . Since t and P are random, therefore,
any matrix, which is similar to the input matrix, with value
scaling is the potential result Y , which means that Y is
indistinguishable. However, due to the above limitation, a
similar matrix of eigenvectors and the ratio between eigen-
values is leaked. ~r is composed by the sum of compressed
eigenvectors, which is fixed with the same input, in this
case, we only need to prove that exposure of ~r will not
cause actual damage to input. It should be noted that ri
is the square sum of corresponding d-dim eigenvectors, it
is impossible to infect the detail value in the vector from
only the square sum of them. This is essentially the problem
in which there are more unknown values than effective
equations on them.
Theorem 7. The secure k-means, HKM index building and
query process are secure in the honest-but-curious model
Proof. All views in Si during calculating the above pro-
cess are brought by SecMul, SecMatMul, and SecSort,
in this case, the above process is secure based on Lemma
4. However, due to the share of ID and the leakage in
SecSort, it is inevitable to leak the similarity between
vectors or images.
Theorem 8. The C2LSH index building and query process
are secure in the honest-but-curious model
Proof. For Si, during executing the index building pro-
cess of C2LSH, besides those brought by SecMatMul,
the viewi = {h′~aj ,bj (ok)}. Here h′~aj ,bj (ok) is the result of
~aj · ~ok + bjwxj , ~aj means the (~a, bj , xj) is the parameter in
j-th LSH table, ~ok means the k-th feature vector stored in
the database, other definitions here are same as formula 2.
As numbers in ~aj are randomly chosen from distribution
N(0, 1), although not uniformly, each h′~aj ,bj (o
k) is randomly
chosen from an infinite field that is indistinguishable. It
should be noted that although plenty of LSH functions map
the same ~ok into different values, which constructs plenty
of effective equations. However, each equation on ~ok will
introduce more unknown random numbers (e.g., ~a). In this
case, the view will not expose any information on detailed
values in ~ok. The situation is similar during the query
process. It should be noted that although the detailed value
information will not be exposed during the index building
process, it is inevitable to leak the similarity information
between images.
8 EXPERIMENT RESULTS
The section evaluates the performance of the proposed
scheme in terms of encryption effectiveness, retrieval accu-
racy and retrieval efficiency. We implement the proposed
scheme on Windows 10 operating system. All the user side
experiments (i.e., image owner, authorized user, and trusty
third party) are executed in a machine with Intel Core i5-
8250u CPU @ 1.6GHZ and 16 GB memory. The cloud side
experiments are executed on two servers running Windows
10 with the LAN setting. Each server is equipped with Intel
Core i7-9700 CPU @ 3GHZ and 16 GB memory. We use
Corel-1k and Corel-10k image dataset as the experimental
dataset. The images in Corel-1k size either 384×256 or
256×384. Corel-1k includes 10 categories of images and each
category contains 100 similar images. The size of images in
Corel-10k is either 187×126 or 126×187. Corel-10k includes
100 categories of images and each category contains 100
similar images.
As described in subsection 2.2, the schemes in the first
category let the image owner undertake the feature extrac-
tion task, which is obviously inferior to our scheme. There-
fore, we focus on the comparison of schemes in the second
category. We first give the comparison of the methods which
execute the privacy-preserving CNN inference.
8.1 Performance of Privacy-Preserving CNN Inference
Protocol
Due to the advantage of our schemes benefit from the
designed protocols, we first show the comparison results of
the complexity of protocols which are shown in Table 2. [6]
compares the sign of numbers based on the most significant
bit, therefore, their protocol needs O(l) rounds interaction,
here l means the bit-length of ciphertext, which is generally
set as 32. [9] gives their scheme based on additive resharing
and multiplicative resharing, however, the transformation
between them always leads to three or more interaction
rounds.
To show the advantage in the scene of privacy-
preserving CNN better, the real-time comparison is given
in Table 3. Same as previous works [34], the MNIST dataset
which contains plenty of 28×28 gray-scale images is used.
The structure of used CNN model comes from the previous
work [42], which is quite similar to VGG16: 2-Conv and 2-
FC with ReLU and MaxPool.
Since our scheme outsources a part of random number
generation tasks to CS, the offline consumption also sig-
nificantly decreases. As a baseline, the actual efficiency of
generating random numbers or matrices is shown as follow:
In one second, T can generate 1.7 × 107 random share of
Beaver′s triples; or 5.4 × 105 random share of matrices
(Ai, Bi, (A ·B)i), where Ai sizes 1× 8 and Bi sizes 8× 1; or
6.4× 103 random share of matrices (Ai, Bi, (A ·B)i), where
Ai sizes 512×8 and Bi sizes 8×1. The baseline will be used
in the subsection 8.3.1.
The above results show the advantage of our schemes
compared to previous CNN inference protocols in time or
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TABLE 2: Comparison of the protocol complexities
(here l means bit-width, and n means the dimension of squared matrix)
SecCmp SecDiv SecMatInv
Rounds Comm(bits) Rounds Comm(bits) Rounds Comm(bits)
Huang [6] l + 1 10l − 2 - - - -
Xiong [9] 3 2l + 2 3 6l - -
Ours 2 6l 2 10l 2 6n2l
TABLE 3: Inference consumption of simple CNN
Runtime(s) Message sizes(MB)
Offline Online Offline Online
MiniONN [42] 472 72 3046 6226
Gazelle [34] 9.34 3.56 940 296
Huang [6] 0.09 0.21 1.57 0.99
Ours 0.002 0.05 1.41 0.24
storage consumption. Besides, our scheme does not need
scaling to ensure that the protocol works correctly, accord-
ingly, no loss in accuracy will be caused in theory. Therefore,
to our knowledge, the most efficient and accurate results in
PPCBIR schemes based on typical features are introduced in
this work. In the following, we only compare our work to
the schemes based on the statistic feature.
8.2 Consumption before retrieval
In this section, we focus on the process from the step
that image owner encrypts his images to the step that the
cloud servers finish the index building. Two typical schemes
[5], [25] based on statistics are chosen as the comparative
experiments, we also give the results in plaintext state as
the baseline and comparison.
8.2.1 Image outsourcing
In our scheme, the image owner only needs to split the
image into two different encrypted images and send them
to two servers. The schemes based on statistics need per-
mutations on the image, which leads to plenty of time
consumption. The time consumption of outsourcing whole
Corel-1k or Corel-10k is shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4: Time consumption of image outsourcing
BOEW [5] Cheng [25] Ours
Corel-1k 281.86s 79.07s 16.59s
Corel-10k 1118.33s 407.7s 84.46s
8.2.2 Feature extraction and aggregation
As described in subsection 6.1, the encrypted feature will
be collaboratively extracted by two servers. Due to plenty
of non-linear operations, the consumption exceeds the
schemes based on statistics. However, on the one hand, the
aggregation consumption is much lower in our scheme; on
the other hand, the time consumption of extraction can be
reduced if simpler CNN models (e.g., Inception-V4 [43])
are used. The total time consumption of the two datasets
is shown in Table 5.
The communication size during feature extraction is
given in Table 6. The tasks in this subsection are all executed
in the offline phase, which means T has sufficient time for
the generation of random numbers or matrices. Therefore,
in this subsection, only the communication consumption
during executing the task is given.
8.2.3 Feature Compression
In this work, the dimension of the compressed feature is
set as 8 for both Corel-1k and Corel-10k. Since the previous
schemes in PPCBIR ignore the process of compression, we
only report the experiment results of our scheme which
are shown in Table 7. It can be seen that the consumption
in compression is negligible compared to the above step,
however, we will show that it will highly decrease the
communication consumption in the following.
8.2.4 Index Building
In our experiments, the hyper-parameter k in HKM is set
as 4, and the minimum number limitation of vectors in
candidates is set as the 3 × m in both HKM and C2LSH,
where m is the number of returned images (e.g., 50). The
other parameters of C2LSH are set as suggested in [19].
Table 8 gives the time consumption of two index build-
ing schemes described in subsection 6.3. Here the results
on both uncompressed and compressed features are given,
and it is easy to notice that the communication consumption
gain significantly decreases. For example, the communica-
tion consumption during HKM building on the compressed
feature is only about 1/38 of the uncompressed version in
Corel-1k.
8.3 Retrieval Consumption and Precision
8.3.1 Retrieval Consumption
Before the authorized user gets the plaintext images he
needs, there are mainly three steps as described in subsec-
tion 6.4: Trapdoor generation, similarity computation in CS, and
decryption.
The time consumption comparison results on retrieval
(return Top-50 similar images) from Corel-1k and Corel-10k
are shown in Table 9 and Table 10. From the tables, it can
be seen that although the feature extraction of our scheme
needs more time compared to statistics based schemes.
However, the advantage of encryption and decryption will
make our total consumption smaller. The non-index (i.e.,
linear index) situation is also given for the comparison. It is
easy to notice that the utilization of index greatly decreases
communication costs, and makes all kinds of consumption
not substantially increase as the size of the dataset increase.
8.3.2 Discussion on trusty third party
From the above experiments, it is easy to see that only two
types of matrices needed to be pre-generated for retrieval.
The size of the matrix is determined by the dimension of the
uncompressed and compressed features, which can be seen
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TABLE 5: Time consumption of feature extraction and aggregation
Xia [5] Cheng [25] Ours Plaintext
Corel-1k Corel-10k Corel-1k Corel-10k Corel-1k Corel-10k Corel-1k Corel-10k
Feature extraction 190.99s 1495.07s 109.79s 426.33s 2113.48s 5455.11s 226.34s 468.32s
Feature aggregation 620.81s 860.73s - - 0.028s 0.279s 0.028s 0.279s
TABLE 6: Communication size of feature extraction
Corel-1k Corel-10k
Feature extraction 428.49GB 1012.45GB
TABLE 7: Consumption of feature compression
Ours Plaintext
Runtime Message size Runtime
Corel-1k 1.719s 31.85MB 0.297s
Corel-10k 3.592s 137.31MB 0.375s
as hyper-parameters shared by all entities before retrieval.
Therefore, T can easily generate enough random matrices
before retrieval.
After giving the actual time consumption of retrieval, we
briefly analyze the choice of trusty third party T . It is fairly
good that the government or other credible agencies which
can be trusty to all participants are willing to undertake this
role, however, it is often difficult to seek in the real world.
In this case, a reasonable assumption is letting the owner of
images play the role instead.
In detail, besides outsourcing images, the image owner
also spends a small amount of computing resources to
generate random numbers and matrices, and the operations
during offline phase are based upon them. Before the query,
the authorized user also costs some time for generation, and
servers will utilize them during the feature extraction of the
query and secure compression process.
When facing actual distance computation, it is inevitable
that the features of both image owner and authorized user
will be involved. As the feature comes from authorized user
is always meaningless to image owner, it is more suitable
for image owner to undertake the generation task for the
process. Since the random data needed during distance
computation is about only 1ms as shown in Table 9 and 10,
which means about one thousand queries can be supported
at the cost of only one second during the offline phase. To
sum up, we believe that the owner of images is suitable and
capable of playing the role of T .
8.3.3 Retrieval accuracy
In our experiments, the ”precision” of a query is defined as
that in [44]: Pm = m′/m, where m′ is the number of real
similar images in the m retrieved images. We choose all the
images in Corel-1k and Corel-10k, and the retrieval accuracy
comparison in these two datasets is shown as Fig. 4.
From the first and second sub-figures, due to the better
feature extractor, it can be seen that our scheme shows
great advantage when compared with the schemes based on
statistics. As the third and fourth sub-figures show, we may
observe that high dimension vectors show better accuracy.
However, when the number of images is small (e.g., Corel-
1k), the compressed feature shows better accuracy and
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Fig. 4: Retrieval accuracy comparison in Corel-1k and
Corel-10k
the utilization of index (e.g., HKM) can even improve the
accuracy by excluding the wrong candidate vectors brought
by the feature extractor. Furthermore, the accuracy of our
scheme is same as the corresponding plaintext state, in other
words, the lossless property is confirmed by both theory and
experiments.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, to bridge the gap between CBIR and PPCBIR,
we utilize typical additive secret sharing and propose a
series of novel protocols to execute secure computation effi-
ciently. We further simulate the inference process of VGG16,
the typical compression and index building schemes for bet-
ter accuracy and efficiency. In future work, we will consider
the construction of better protocols and other applications
based on additive secret sharing.
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TABLE 8: Consumption of Index Building
Corel-1k Corel-10k
Ours Plaintext Ours Plaintext
Runtime Message sizes Runtime Runtime Message sizes Runtime
HKM 512-dim 10.13s 781.69MB 1.05s 275.63s 25.74GB 12.97s8-dim 2.44s 20.87MB 0.75s 46.67s 569.19MB 7.72s
C2LSH 512-dim 1.43s 6.81MB 0.52s 15.99s 65.61MB 6.18s8-dim 1.17s 1.99MB 0.39s 12.98s 25.88MB 5.23s
TABLE 9: Retrieval Consumption in Corel-1k (Top-50)
BOEW [5] Cheng [25] Ours PlaintextOffline Online
Runtime Runtime Runtime Runtime Message sizes Runtime
Trapdoor generation 0.28s 0.08s - 0.017s - -
Similarity
computation
in CS
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